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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	suggests	that	Michel	Foucault	is	a	nuisance	for	scholars	of	organizations,	albeit	a	productive	one.
Foucault	disavowed	the	study	of	organizations,	yet	his	work	was	fundamentally	concerned	with	the	administering
of	lives,	a	central	concern	of	scholars	of	organizations.	The	chapter	explores	this	tension	by	examining	four
displacements	that	Foucault	sought	to	effect:	first,	a	move	from	asking	‘why’	type	questions	to	‘how’	type
questions;	second,	a	concern	with	subjectivity	that	discards	the	ethical	polarization	of	subject	and	object	in	favour
of	an	analysis	of	the	historically	varying	ways	in	which	the	capacities	and	attributes	of	subjects	are	constituted;
third,	a	focus	on	practices	rather	than	organizations,	and	a	concern	to	analyse	sets	or	assemblages	of	practices	in
terms	of	how	they	emerge	and	how	they	are	stabilized	over	time;	fourth,	a	focus	on	rationalities	in	the	plural.	It	then
examines	the	‘Foucault	effect’	in	organization	studies.
Keywords:	Foucault, 	organization	studies,	practices,	subjectivity,	administering	of	lives
Introduction
Michel	Foucault	is	a	nuisance	for	scholars	of	organizations.	Not	only	did	he	say	little	about	the	topic,	but	he	made	it
clear	on	numerous	occasions	that	his	interests	lay	elsewhere—particularly	with	practices,	but	also	with	a	set	of
disciplines	that	at	first	sight	have	little	to	do	with	formal	organizations.	Conversely,	and	equally	awkwardly,	one	of
his	most	central	concerns	was	with	the	administering	and	organizing	of	lives,	both	within	and	beyond	carceral
settings.	So,	we	are	faced	with	a	considerable	challenge:	to	make	the	link	between	Foucault’s	writings	on	the	one
hand,	which	are	centrally	concerned	with	the	activity	of	administering,	and	the	concerns	of	scholars	of
organizations	and	administration	on	the	other.	And	we	need	to	do	this	while	not	effacing	the	profoundly	innovative
and	potentially	discomforting	way	in	which	Foucault	posed	questions	and	framed	his	objects	of	interest.	Further,	we
need	to	do	so	while	respecting	the	shifting	nature	of	Foucault’s	preoccupations,	yet	without	traducing	the
continuity	of	concerns	that	can	be	lost	if	a	proclivity	for	periodizing	takes	precedence	over	analysing.
There	is	a	further	challenge:	how	to	select	from	or	distil	the	vast	corpus	of	Foucault’s	writings	across	a	30-year
period.	Our	way	of	dealing	with	this	is	to	select	themes,	many	of	which	span	the	large	part	of	Foucault’s	life	as	a
scholar	and	activist,	even	if	the	nuances	of	their	framing	and	the	objects	to	which	they	were	applied	varied
considerably.	We	make	no	claim	that	these	themes	contain	all	of	Foucault’s	concerns.	Nor	do	we	claim	that	there
are	not	other,	equally	plausible,	ways	of	slicing	through	his	oeuvre,	which	sits	rather	awkwardly	somewhere
between	political	theory,	philosophy,	history,	and	sociology.	We	do	claim,	however,	that	this	way	of	viewing
Foucault’s	work	allows	us	to	discern	the	key	displacements	that	Foucault’s	writings	suggest,	and	that	this	allows	us
in	turn	to	identify	some	key	features	of	his	work	that	have	relevance	for	scholars	of	organizations.	(p.	12)
We	identify	four	such	themes	or	displacements:	first,	a	move	from	asking	‘why’	type	questions	to	asking	‘how’	type
*
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questions;	second,	a	concern	with	subjectivity	that	avoids	the	ethical	polarization	of	subject	and	object	in	favour	of
an	analysis	of	the	historically	varying	ways	in	which	the	capacities	and	attributes	of	subjects	are	constituted;	third,
a	focus	on	practices	rather	than	organizations,	and	a	concern	to	analyse	sets	or	assemblages	of	practices	both	in
terms	of	how	they	emerge	and	how	they	are	stabilized	over	time;	fourth,	a	focus	on	rationalities	in	the	plural	as
distinct	from	rationality	or	rationalization	in	the	singular,	suggesting	the	importance	of	emphasizing	that	practices
do	not	exist	outside	a	particular	regime	of	rationality,	but	also	that	such	regimes	of	rationality	need	to	be	studied	in
terms	of	the	diverse	fields	and	levels	at	which	they	are	formulated.
In	the	next	section,	we	consider	each	of	these	four	themes	in	turn.	In	the	section	that	follows,	we	consider	the
‘Foucault	effect’	in	organization	studies.	We	suggest	that	this	effect	has	been	productive,	in	that	it	has	extended
the	investigation	of	the	multiple	sites	of	emergence	of	technologies	of	rule,	and	the	forms	they	assume,	beyond
those	analysed	by	Foucault	and	his	co-workers.	Also,	we	suggest	that	it	has	contributed	more	generally	to	a
transformation	of	organization	studies	which	entailed	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	power,	and	an	increased	focus
on	issues	of	language	and	identity.	However,	we	also	suggest	that	an	overpreoccupation	with	the	notion	of
discipline	and	the	image	of	the	Panopticon,	a	relative	neglect	by	some	of	practices	and	the	assemblages	in	which
they	operate,	combined	with	a	predilection	for	theoretical	micro-differentiation	rather	than	detailed	empirical
investigation,	has	somewhat	limited	our	understanding	of	the	ways	in	which	organization	studies	can	benefit	from	a
critical	engagement	with	Foucault’s	writings. 	Further,	we	suggest	that	the	tendency,	in	some	quarters,	to	rehearse
and	recycle	the	very	categories	that	Foucault	and	others	have	sought	to	reframe,	in	particular	the	comforting
calculus	of	domination	and	emancipation,	has	limited	the	potential	for	careful	investigation	of	the	recent	and	still
ongoing	profound	changes	in	the	administering	of	lives	in	the	West	and	the	Rest	(Hall,	1992).	In	the	final	section,
we	offer	some	comments	on	the	utilization	of	Foucault’s	work	by	accounting	scholars.	This	has	been	one	of	the
most	sustained	areas	of	enquiry	adjacent	to	organizational	analysis	in	which	Foucault’s	style	of	analysis	has	been
deployed,	although,	and	with	important	exceptions,	it	has	been	relatively	neglected	by	organization	scholars.
Questions	of	Method
Even	today,	Foucault’s	writings	can	appear	disconcerting	or	daunting.	This	is	not	only	because	of	their	remarkable
volume	and	scope, 	but	because	a	series	of	conceptual	displacements	were	central	to	his	work.	It	is	no	doubt	this,
rather	than	any	inherent	obtuseness	of	style,	that	gives	rise	to	the	often	heard	comment	that	Foucault’s	writings
are	difficult	or	dense.	Here,	we	will	enumerate	just	some	of	the	key	shifts	that	he	effected.	(p.	13)
A	first	key	move	was	from	‘why’	to	‘how’.	Organization	scholars	and	many	others,	including	political	theorists,	had
typically	asked	‘why’	type	questions.	Why,	for	instance,	did	a	particular	organization	or	type	of	organization
appear	or	change	at	a	particular	moment	in	time?	Why	did	a	particular	problem	present	itself	at	a	particular	moment
in	time?	Here,	the	notion	of	interests	(whether	professional,	or	occupational,	or	personal)	was	often	appealed	to,
together	with	gestures	to	processes	such	as	globalization	or	modernization.	Foucault	asked	a	different	question,
not	‘why’	but	‘how’.	How,	for	instance,	did	madness,	or	disease,	or	delinquency,	or	sexuality,	come	to	be
established	as	something	that	really	exists	and	that	can	be	known	and	acted	on?	In	a	range	of	studies	spanning
several	decades,	Foucault	explored	what	he	called	at	one	point	rather	enigmatically	the	‘surfaces	of	emergence’
of	such	phenomena	(Foucault,	1972:	41),	and	how	they	were	linked	to	a	conjoint	process	of	normalizing	and	of
subjecting	such	objects	of	concern	to	the	division	between	true	and	false.	Such	surfaces	of	emergence	vary,	he
argued,	across	periods	and	places.	They	may	be	the	family,	the	immediate	social	group,	the	workplace,	or
whatever.	Later,	the	term	‘problematization’	came	to	play	a	similar	role,	suggesting	that	we	should	focus	on	the
ways	in	which	certain	phenomena	come	to	be	framed	and	constituted	as	problems	to	be	addressed	(see	also
Castel,	1994).	This	meant	discarding	the	objectivity	often	attributed	to	problems,	the	notion	that	problems	are	sitting
out	there	waiting	to	be	discovered,	and	that	once	discovered	solutions	will	be	devised	for	them,	or	that	the
connecting	of	problems	and	solutions	is	more	or	less	random	(see	e.g.	the	garbage	can	model	of	organizational
choice	by	Cohen,	March,	&	Olsen,	1972).	Instead,	Foucault	and	others	suggested	that	problematizing	is	a	delicate
process	of	assembling	and	aligning	actors	and	arguments	such	that	a	measure	of	agreement	is	achieved,	meaning
that	depopulation,	pauperism,	the	decline	of	the	race,	industrial	militancy,	lack	of	competitiveness,	or	whatever	are
both	significant	problems	and	that	they	can	be	addressed.	To	adapt	a	phrase	of	Ian	Hacking’s,	if	solutions	appear
to	fit	problems	so	tidily,	this	is	because	they	have	been	made	to	fit,	rather	than	because	that	is	how	the	world	is
(Hacking,	1983).
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This	suggests	a	focus	on	the	production	or	emergence	of	phenomena,	the	study	of	the	conceptual	and	practical
operations	through	which	something	such	as	madness	can	be	brought	into	existence	as	the	object	of	a	body	of
knowledge	and	a	set	of	normalizing	practices	(Foucault,	1967,	1977).	In	one	of	his	most	important	studies,	albeit
one	that	appears	rather	distant	from	the	concerns	of	organization	scholars,	Foucault	examined	what	he
enigmatically	called	the	historical	a	priori	of	the	‘clinical	gaze’,	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	forming	of	a
contingent	interlocking	or	stabilizing	of	a	heterogeneous	set	of	relations	(Foucault,	1973;	cf.	also	Gordon,	1980a:
243).	Similarly,	in	his	more	recent	writings	on	governmentality	(see	e.g.	Foucault,	2007,	2008),	Foucault	was
concerned	with	how	type	questions	applied	to	the	formation	of	phenomena,	in	this	instance	how	the	art	of
governing	has	sought	not	only	to	govern	individuals	and	populations,	but	in	doing	so	to	construct	very	particular
types	of	persons	and	sets	of	persons	along	with	a	range	of	reflections	on	the	aims	and	objectives	of	governing.
This	is	why	Foucault	and	others	have	placed	such	emphasis	on	programmes,	on	the	activity	of	programming,	and
on	rationalities.	We	consider	this	in	more	detail	in	the	following	sections,	as	the	(p.	14)	 significance	of	attending	to
the	realm	of	the	programmatic,	in	all	its	multiple	forms,	has	at	times	been	misunderstood	and	misrepresented	in	the
organization	studies	literature.	What	is	at	issue	here	is	a	concern	with	the	changing	shape	of	the	thinkable	and	the
doable	(Gordon,	1991:	7),	a	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	a	variety	of	actors	and	texts	have	set	out	who	can	govern,
to	what	ends,	through	what	devices,	to	what	extent,	and	so	on.
This	leads	us	on	to	a	second	key	displacement,	concerning	subjectivity.	Many	have	written	about	the	effects	of
particular	practices	on	the	subjectivity	of	workers,	managers,	children,	mothers,	and	so	on	(see	e.g.	Braverman,
1974;	Burawoy,	1979;	Lipietz,	1992;	Noble,	1977,	1984).	Indeed,	some	organization	scholars	have	called	for
greater	attention	to	subjectivity	or	agency	(see	e.g.	Beckert,	2009;	Crozier	&	Friedberg,	1980;	DiMaggio,	1988;
Lawrence,	1999;	Oliver,	1991;	Powell,	1991).	Foucault’s	concern	was	different.	Rather	than	positing	a	universal
form	for	the	human	subject,	he	examined	the	historically	variable	ways	in	which	the	capacities	and	attributes	of
subjects	were	constituted	(see	e.g.	Foucault,	1988,	2001	[1982];	but	see	also	du	Gay,	1993,	1996a,	1996b;	Heller,
Sosna,	&	Wellbery,	1986;	Knights	&	Willmott,	1989;	Martin,	Gutman,	&	Hutton,	1988).	Put	differently,	Foucault
resolutely	discarded	the	ethical	polarization	of	subject	and	object,	which	elevates	subjectivity	to	the	position	of
moral	autonomy,	and	similarly	rejected	the	assumption	that	domination	falsifies	the	essence	of	human	subjectivity
(Gordon,	1980a:	239).	In	its	place,	he	put	forward	a	conception	of	power	that	takes	the	form	of	both	subjectification
and	objectification,	a	form	of	power	that	is	intrinsically	dependent	on	making	individuals	subjects	(Foucault,	2001
[1982]:	331).
This	scepticism	about	ontological	claims	concerning	subjectivity	entailed	an	equivalent	commitment,	throughout	his
work	from	Madness	and	Civilization	to	The	Will	to	Know,	to	explore	the	multiple	conditions	of	possibility	for	the
making	of	the	modern	subject	(see	also	Foucault,	1988).	As	Foucault	himself	put	it,	his	concern	was	to	produce	a
history	of	the	different	ways	in	which	‘human	beings	are	made	subjects’	(Foucault,	2001	[1982]:	326).	This	takes
us	to	the	heart	of	our	present,	an	era	that	cherishes	a	commitment	to	individuals	as	knowing	and	knowable
subjects,	coupled	with	incessant	endeavours	to	administer	and	normalize	their	conduct	(see	also	Meyer	&
Jepperson,	2000).	Initially,	for	Foucault,	this	took	the	form	of	examining	the	specific	‘truth	games’,	administrative
techniques,	and	institutional	settings	through	which	human	beings	sought	to	develop	knowledge	about	themselves
and	others,	whether	through	the	disciplines	of	psychiatry,	medicine,	biology,	or	economics.	Subsequently,	Foucault
gave	more	explicit	attention	to	what	he	called	‘technologies	of	the	self’,	the	ways	in	which	individuals	act	on	their
selves,	and	how	this	action	on	the	self	can	be	linked	up	to	actions	on	the	social	body	as	a	whole.	Foucault	spoke
here	of	actions	on	the	actions	of	others,	the	conduct	of	conduct.	For,	what	defines	a	relationship	of	power,
according	to	Foucault,	is	that	it	is	a	mode	of	action	that	does	not	act	directly	on	others.	Instead,	it	acts	upon	their
actions,	whether	an	existing	action	or	one	that	may	arise	in	the	future.	And,	the	‘other’	over	whom	power	is
exercised	remains	resolutely	a	person	who	acts,	who	is	faced	with	a	whole	field	of	possible	actions	and	reactions
(Foucault,	2001	[1982]:	341–2).
Regardless	of	the	nuances	of	emphasis	throughout	his	writings,	and	the	varying	empirical	focus	of	his
investigations,	this	is	what	allowed	Foucault	to	frame	the	issue	(p.	15)	 of	power	in	such	a	distinctive	and	relational
manner	(Miller,	2010;	Veyne,	1978).	And	it	is	also	what	makes	Foucault’s	writings	so	relevant	for	scholars	of
organizations.	The	manager	making	a	decision	about	how	to	spend	or	allocate	a	budget,	how	to	achieve	a
specified	return	on	investment	or	a	required	internal	rate	of	return,	is	almost	the	perfect	embodiment	of	power
understood	in	this	manner.	For	the	manager	remains	‘free’	to	decide,	yet	is	enmeshed	within	a	web	of	financial
norms	that	rule	out	telling	her	how	to	act	in	a	specific	instance.	Governing,	understood	in	this	sense,	is	not	only
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about	overtly	political	structures	or	states,	rather	it	covers	all	socially	legitimated	modes	of	action	that	are	more	or
less	considered	and	calculated,	and	that	seek	to	act	in	a	deliberate	manner	upon	the	possibilities	of	action	of
others.	As	Foucault	put	it	so	succinctly,	to	govern	in	this	sense	is	to	‘structure	the	possible	field	of	action	of	others’
(Foucault,	2001	[1982]:	341).
Foucault	once	said,	somewhat	enigmatically,	that	it	was	not	power	but	the	subject	that	was	the	general	theme	of	his
research	(Foucault,	2001	[1982]:	326).	By	this,	he	meant	that	to	analyse	power	relations	entailed	analysing	the
myriad	of	ways	in	which	individuals	are	made	subjects,	the	multiple	ways	in	which	socially	legitimated	authorities
seek	to	act	indirectly	on	the	actions	of	others.	While	this	might	be	carried	out	in	the	more	obviously	political
domains	of	existence,	it	had,	if	anything,	even	more	resonance	for	those	less	obviously	political	domains,	such	as
within	families,	schools,	communities,	and	hospitals.	Perhaps	most	importantly	for	our	purposes	here,	it	meant
analysing	the	almost	incessant	attempts	to	administer	or	act	on	the	actions	of	others	within	organizations	and	firms.
Insofar	as	much	of	these	attempts	to	act	on	the	actions	of	others	entail	attempts	to	economize	social	relations	(see
Çalışkan	&	Callon,	2009,	2010;	see	also	Miller	&	Power,	2013),	both	within	the	already	marketized	realm	and
beyond,	this	linking	of	a	concern	with	the	subject	and	a	preoccupation	with	relations	of	power	enabled	Foucault	to
provide	a	highly	perceptive	analysis	of	the	phenomenon	of	liberalism	and	neo-liberalism.	For	such	governmental
rationalities	depend	on	seeking	to	govern	well	by	governing	less.	Foucault’s	notion	of	government,	or
governmentality,	was	based	on	the	distinctive	premise	that	power,	understood	as	a	form	of	action	on	the	actions	of
others,	is	dependent	on	freedom.	Understood	as	the	conduct	of	others’	conduct,	government	here	was	not	limited
to	overtly	political	structures	and	the	management	of	states,	it	meant	a	much	broader	concern	with	the	ways	in
which	the	conduct	of	individuals	or	groups	might	be	directed	(cf.	the	analogy	with	Weber’s	concerns,	Gordon,
2001:	xxix).	It	meant	also	giving	particular	attention	to	the	techniques	and	practices	that	seek	to	link	up	the
administration	of	individuals	and	the	administration	of	populations,	something	that	has	been	given	heightened
significance	since	the	late	1970s	as	a	number	of	Western	governments	began	confronting	their	citizens	with	a	dual
injunction:	to	respect	the	realities	of	the	market,	while	accepting	their	duties	to	become	enterprising	selves	(see
also	du	Gay,	1993,	1994;	Gordon,	2001:	xxiii).
No	doubt	this	marks	a	shift	in	Foucault’s	concerns,	from	the	specialized	knowledges	of	the	individual	(psychiatry,
medicine,	penology)	and	their	institutional	counterparts	(the	asylum,	the	hospital,	the	prison)	to	the	exercise	of
government	over	an	entire	(p.	16)	 population.	But	the	concern	with	subjectivity	remains	a	constant,	and	is	if
anything	made	even	more	central	to	the	administering	of	lives.	Put	differently,	the	‘macro’	and	the	‘micro’	analysis
of	power	come	together	in	a	particular	historical	moment,	one	that	both	emphasizes	the	responsibilities	of
individuals	to	become	entrepreneurs	of	themselves,	while	elevating	the	notion	of	economic	enterprise	to	a
generalized	principle	for	the	social	body	as	a	whole.	Subjectivity,	refashioned	here	according	to	the	notion	of	the
individual	as	an	ensemble	of	enterprises,	provides	a	way	of	redescribing	governmental	action	through	a
progressive	economization	of	social	relations	centred	on	the	injunction	that	individuals	make	enterprises	of	their
lives	(see	Foucault,	2008;	but	also	du	Gay,	1993;	Gordon,	2001;	Rose,	1989,	1998).
Foucault’s	concerns	with	the	links	between	a	particular	notion	of	subjectivity	and	the	governing	of	populations
were	clearly	set	out	in	his	lecture	on	‘governmentality’	delivered	at	the	Collège	de	France	in	1978	(Foucault,	2007).
A	little	over	a	decade	later	this	lecture,	together	with	a	range	of	commentaries	and	analyses,	was	made	widely
available	in	English	(Burchell,	Gordon,	&	Miller,	1991).	The	reception	of	these	materials	was	far	from	immediate	(cf.
Miller	&	Rose,	1995a,	showing	how	‘governmentality	studies’	were	developing	by	then),	although	the	recent
translation	of	a	series	of	lectures	delivered	the	following	year	have	encouraged	renewed	attention	to	the
phenomenon	of	neo-liberalism	and	the	particular	governmental	rationality	it	articulates	and	the	devices	on	which	it
depends	(Foucault,	2008).
A	complementary	line	of	enquiry,	and	an	unlikely	yet	highly	relevant	one	for	scholars	of	organizations,	was	that
opened	up	by	Foucault’s	writings	on	the	history	of	sexuality	(Foucault,	1981	[1976]).	Here,	Foucault	framed	the
issue	of	sex	and	sexuality	as	part	of	a	much	broader	phenomenon:	the	entry	of	life,	and	attempts	to	optimize	and
administer	it,	into	systems	of	political	power.	This	meant	emphasizing	the	ways	in	which	the	governing	of	individual
behaviours	is	linked	to	the	governing	of	populations.	Put	differently,	towards	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century
‘population’	emerged	as	an	economic	and	political	problem.	Sexuality	was	but	one	part,	albeit	a	very	important
one,	of	the	more	general	phenomenon	of	the	administering	of	individual	lives	and	entire	populations.	Foucault’s
admittedly	rather	cryptic	comments	on	method	here	gave	rise	to	some	misunderstandings.	For	instance,	the
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statement	that	‘power	is	everywhere’	(Foucault,	1981	[1976]:	93)	may	have	given	support	to	those	that	saw	in
Foucault’s	work	a	dystopian	image	of	a	form	of	power	that	is	omnipotent,	however	inaccurate	such	a	reading	would
be.	Such	misreadings	are	unfortunate,	as	Foucault’s	emphasis	on	the	productive	role	of	power	relations,	their
immanence	in	the	spheres	in	which	they	operate	(economic	processes,	knowledge	relationships,	sexual	relations),
and	the	multiple	points	from	which	they	operate,	were	immensely	suggestive	for	those	that	wished	to	extend	the
empirical	reach	of	his	analyses,	as	subsequent	studies	have	shown	(see	also	Miller	&	Rose,	1995a).
Of	particular	importance	for	our	purposes	was	his	emphasis	on	a	notion	of	power	based	on	attempts	to	administer
life	so	as	to	optimize	it,	albeit	through	a	panoply	of	controls,	regulations,	and	interventions	(Foucault,	1981	[1976]:
135–45).	Foucault	pointed	to	two	linked	series	of	interventions.	One	focused	on	the	body	as	a	machine:	its
disciplining,	the	optimization	of	its	capability,	and	the	attempt	to	enhance	its	usefulness	(p.	17)	 and	integrate	it
into	ever	more	efficient	systems	of	economic	controls.	The	other	focused	on	the	population	as	a	whole:	its
propagation,	birth	and	death	rates,	level	of	health,	life	expectancy,	longevity,	and	so	forth.	Foucault	used	the	term
‘sovereign	power’	to	designate	a	form	of	power	that	was	limited	to	the	taking	of	life,	the	power	of	death,	and
contrasted	this	with	the	rather	awkwardly	named	‘bio-power’,	a	form	of	power	based	on	the	administration	of	bodies
and	the	calculated	management	of	life.	Echoing	Marx’s	analysis	of	the	development	of	capitalism	and	the
accumulation	of	capital,	Foucault	remarked	that	this	would	not	have	been	possible	without	the	parallel
‘accumulation	of	men’,	the	‘controlled	insertion	of	bodies	into	the	machinery	of	production	and	the	adjustment	of
the	phenomenon	of	population	to	economic	processes’	(Foucault,	1981	[1976]:	141).	This	was	a	theme	that	he
elaborated	on	in	1976	in	a	collaborative	volume	titled	Les	machines	à	guérir	(Foucault	et	al.,	1976).	There	Foucault
spoke	of	the	emergence	of	the	health	and	physical	well-being	of	the	population	as	one	of	the	key	objectives	of
political	power	in	the	late	eighteenth	century	(see	also	Foucault,	1980	[1976]:	170).	The	preservation,	upkeep,	and
conservation	of	the	‘labour	force’	are	part	of	a	wider	phenomenon,	one	that	centres	on	attempts	to	intervene	so	as
to	modify	lives	not	only	to	ensure	their	subjection	but	to	enhance	their	utility.	Such	interventions	operated	in	a
multiplicity	of	diverse	sites,	including	the	family,	the	army,	schools,	and	so	on.	In	such	sites,	individual	lives,	as	well
as	life	viewed	collectively,	were	made	subject	to	explicit	calculations	designed	to	allow	it	to	be	governed	and
administered.
A	third	key	displacement	was	to	focus	on	practices,	together	with	an	emphasis	on	analysing	sets	or	assemblages
of	interdependent	practices	and	how	they	emerge	and	are	stabilized	at	particular	moments	in	time.	This	is	perhaps
one	of	the	more	troubling	or	discomforting	aspects	of	Foucault’s	writings	for	scholars	of	organizations,	insofar	as	it
displaces	the	category	of	organization	from	centre	stage,	and	puts	there	instead	the	study	of	sets	of
heterogeneous	practices.	Put	differently,	the	focus	of	attention	shifts	from	the	organization	(whether	singly,	or	as	a
set	of	related	organizations,	as	in	more	recent	network	analysis)	to	the	historically	contingent	and	interrelated	sets
of	ideas	and	instruments	that	are	deployed	within,	across,	and	between	entities	that	seek	to	administer	the	lives	of
others.
Echoing	his	earlier	arguments	in	The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge	(Foucault,	1972),	Foucault	spoke	of	analysing	a
‘regime	of	practices’,	the	regularities,	logic,	and	self-evidence	that	connects	what	is	said	and	what	is	done,	the
codes	imposed,	and	the	reasons	given.	To	analyse	regimes	of	practices	means	to	analyse	programmes	of	conduct
that	have	prescriptive	effects	concerning	what	is	to	be	done,	and	codifying	effects	regarding	what	is	to	be	known
(Foucault,	1991	[1981]:	75).	It	means	analysing	the	interrelations	and	interdependency	between	the	discursive	and
the	non-discursive,	not	only	what	is	said	and	done	but	the	ways	in	which	what	is	said	programmes	or	codes	what
can	and	should	be	done	(cf.	also	Gordon,	1980a;	Miller	&	Rose,	2008).	So,	it	was	not	a	matter	of	writing	a	history	of
the	prison	as	an	organization	or	institution,	but	the	practice	of	imprisonment,	with	the	aim	of	showing	how	this
came	to	be	accepted	at	a	certain	moment	as	a	key	component	of	the	penal	system,	something	apparently
indispensable	and	self-evident.	Likewise	with	madness,	it	was	a	matter	of	showing	how	a	whole	set	of	(p.	18)
practices	helped	give	reality	to	the	phenomenon	of	madness	as	something	that	could	be	known	and	acted	upon	as
something	natural	and	taken	for	granted.
It	is	important	to	emphasize	here	that	the	notion	of	practices	is	not	reducible	to	that	of	‘material	devices’,	such	as	a
pricing	equation,	a	shopping	cart	or	a	nuclear	reactor	(Muniesa,	Millo,	&	Callon,	2007:	2–3).	The	recent
rediscovery	of	performativity	has	been	helpful	in	giving	renewed	attention	to	the	domain	of	economic	sociology,
and	it	has	also	emphasized	the	importance	of	a	particular	subset	of	instruments	that	serve	to	format	the	economy
(Callon,	1998;	MacKenzie,	2006;	MacKenzie	&	Millo,	2003;	MacKenzie,	Muniesa,	&	Siu,	2007).	But	it	has	led	to	a
relative	neglect	of	the	interrelations	between	such	instruments	and	the	historically	varying	ideas	or	rationalities	that
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require	and	inspire	them.	As	the	historian	Paul	Veyne	remarked	over	30	years	ago,	for	Foucault	it	was	not	a	matter
of	starting	from	the	study	of	objects,	but	analysing	the	sets	of	practices	that	fashion	and	form	the	objects	which
become	the	correlate	of	historically	specific	sets	of	practices	(Veyne,	1978:	218).	As	Veyne	also	remarked,	this
places	relations	at	the	heart	of	the	analysis,	and	it	highlights	a	key	methodological	injunction	of	Foucault’s:	to
accord	primacy	to	the	relations	that	link	actors,	instruments,	and	ideas	(Veyne,	1978:	236).	This	means	attending
not	only	to	the	devices	that	instrumentalize	the	real,	but	analysing	their	interdependence	with	the	multiple
rationalities	and	codes	that	seek	to	prescribe	how	the	real	is	to	be	programmed.	As	Rose	and	Miller	argued	prior	to
the	recent	rediscovery	of	performativity	(see	also	Austin,	1962;	Hänninen	&	Palonen,	1990;	Shapiro,	1984),	such
rationalities	are	not	merely	contemplative	or	justificatory,	they	are	performative	(Rose	&	Miller,	1992:	177),	and	this
applies	as	much	to	the	governing	of	economic	life	as	it	does	to	the	exercise	of	political	rule	(Miller	&	Rose,	1990).
Foucault	was	not	interested	in	studying	this	or	that	device	as	something	that	appeared	to	‘perform’	more	or	less	by
itself,	but	worked	according	to	a	principle	of	‘causal	multiplication’	(Foucault,	1991	[1981]:	76).	As	he	put	it,	this
meant	‘lightening	the	weight	of	causality’,	multiplying	the	processes	and	practices	that	bring	something	such	as
punishment	or	madness	into	existence.	This	meant	an	increasing	polymorphism	of	the	elements	brought	into
relation	with	each	other,	an	increasing	polymorphism	of	the	relations	described,	and	an	increasing	polymorphism	of
the	domains	of	reference	(Foucault,	1991	[1981]:	77).	Commenting	on	Discipline	and	Punish	(Foucault,	1977),
which	is	perhaps	Foucault’s	most	sociological	book,	and	the	one	that	caught	the	attention	of	many	organization
scholars	and	indeed	others,	Deleuze	spoke	of	the	‘spatio-temporal	multiplicity’	that	is	intrinsic	to	the	diagram	or	the
abstract	machine,	which	itself	is	made	up	of	a	tissue	of	non-localizable	relations	that	are	immanent	to	the	domain	in
which	they	operate,	and	coextensive	with	the	social	field	(Deleuze,	1999	[1988]:	21–38).
For	scholars	of	organizations,	this	means	attending	to	such	assemblages,	rather	than	focusing	only	on	the	devices
that	help	to	instrumentalize	them	(Miller	&	Rose,	1990:	7)	(see	also	Deleuze,	1999	[1988];	Miller,	1991;	Miller	&
O’Leary,	1994b). 	The	minimum	unit	of	analysis	according	to	this	view	is	the	assemblage,	whether	it	is	the	health-
assemblage,	the	madness-assemblage,	or	the	punishment-assemblage,	all	of	which	Foucault	studied,	or	the
producing-assemblage	or	the	market-assemblage	which	others	have	recently	started	to	analyse	(see	e.g.	du	Gay,
Millo,	&	Tuck,	2012).	Such	(p.	19)	 assemblages	are	themselves	multiplicities,	made	up	of	many	heterogeneous
liaisons	and	relations.	Their	only	unity	is	that	of	their	co-functioning,	and	their	operation	is	always	and	necessarily
both	social	and	technical.
A	fourth	displacement	concerns	rationality,	or	rather	rationalities.	On	this	point,	Foucault	was	occasionally	and
rather	unusually	immoderate	in	his	comments	concerning	parallel	lines	of	enquiry,	in	this	instance	the	writings	of
Max	Weber	and	the	Frankfurt	School.	Perhaps	his	strongest	remark	in	this	regard	was	to	say	that	‘the	word
rationalization	is	dangerous’	(Foucault,	2001	[1982]:	329,	italics	in	original)	(see	also	Foucault,	2001	[1979]:	299).
He	went	on	to	say	that	we	should	analyse	specific	rationalities,	rather	than	invoke	the	notion	of	rationalization	in
general.	Instead	of	taking	the	rationalization	of	society	or	culture,	this	meant	analysing	such	a	process	in	the
diverse	fields	in	which	it	took	place:	madness,	illness,	death,	crime,	sexuality,	and	so	on.	Understandably,	Dreyfus
and	Rabinow	(1982)	saw	Foucault’s	writings	as	inheriting	Weber’s	concerns	with	the	increasing	objectification	of
social	life	through	bureaucratization	and	calculative	thinking,	while	shifting	the	focus	to	a	genealogical	analysis
(Dreyfus	&	Rabinow,	1982:	165).	Foucault	himself	argued	against	postulating	an	absolute	or	invariant	value
inherent	in	reason,	and	in	favour	of	examining	how	particular	forms	of	rationality	inscribe	themselves	in	practices
or	sets	of	practices,	on	the	grounds	that	‘practices’	do	not	exist	outside	a	particular	regime	of	rationality	(Foucault,
1991	[1981]:	79).
The	point,	however,	is	not	to	traduce	Weber	in	order	to	do	justice	to	Foucault,	as	Colin	Gordon	has	aptly	remarked
(Gordon,	1987:	294).	Indeed,	as	the	writings	of	Wilhelm	Hennis	have	demonstrated	(see	e.g.	Hennis,	1983),
Weber’s	concerns	with	Lebensführung,	the	conduct	of	life,	are	much	closer	to	Foucault’s	concern	with
‘technologies	of	the	self’	than	previous	commentators	have	suggested	(Schluchter,	1979,	1981).	The	point	is	to
register	firmly	the	importance	in	Foucault’s	writings	of	attending	to	the	reflected	or	programmatic	aspects	of	social
life.	This	is	not	to	conflate	the	discursive	or	the	programmatic	with	daily	life	in	prisons,	asylums,	factories,	or
whatever.	The	aim	in	fact	is	the	reverse,	to	insist	on	the	gap	that	separates	programmes	and	their	effects.	Nor	is	it
to	conjure	up	some	dystopian	vision	of	social	subjection	in	which	the	programmatic	achieves	omnipotence	and
obliterates	difference	and	differentiation.	As	Miller	and	Rose	(1990:	10)	have	argued,	programmes	are	‘congenitally
failing’,	and	are	defined	by	their	inherent	limits,	their	often	rivalrous	nature,	the	multitude	of	difficulties	and
obstacles	that	arise	as	they	are	put	to	work,	whether	this	takes	the	form	of	underfunding,	professional	and	intra-
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professional	rivalries,	communication	systems	that	fail,	or	whatever.	‘Reality’	always	escapes,	for	it	is	too	unruly	to
be	captured	by	the	dreams	and	schemes	of	the	programmers.
That	said,	programmes	are	much	more	than	wishes	or	intentions.	Programmes	presuppose	that	the	domain	they
help	bring	into	existence	and	seek	to	intervene	in	can	be	known	and	be	made	programmable.	Programmes,	and	the
language	and	ideas	through	which	they	are	articulated,	are	inherently	performative	(Rose	&	Miller,	1992:	177).
The	specific	domains	they	address	and	problematize—the	layout	of	a	factory	floor,	national	competitiveness,
product	quality,	or	whatever—are	themselves	co-created	with	the	solutions	they	devise.	And	these	relatively
localized	programmes	are	themselves	linked,	often	in	rather	tenuous	and	mediated	ways,	with	more	abstract
political	rationalities	or	(p.	20)	 ideas	that	seek	to	specify	the	principles	that	should	guide	the	administering	of	lives
and	the	responsibilities	of	rulers	and	the	ruled:	freedom,	justice,	equality,	mutual	responsibility,	enterprise,
efficiency,	fairness,	and	so	on.
This	is	why	Rose	and	Miller	(1992)	proposed	a	tripartite	distinction	between	political	rationalities,	programmes,	and
technologies,	and	insisted	on	their	mutual	interrelations,	even	if	this	has	at	times	been	reduced	to	a	binary
distinction	between	programmes	and	technologies	(cf.	also	Gordon,	1980a,	and	his	tripartite	distinction	between
strategies,	programmes,	and	technologies).	And	this	is	why	Foucault’s	writings	have	so	much	to	offer	to	scholars	of
organizations.	For	they	offer	a	way	of	linking	up	the	‘macro’	and	the	‘micro’.	So,	rather	than	view	Foucault’s	focus
on	governmental	rationalities	in	his	later	writings	as	a	redirecting	of	his	concerns,	and	rather	than	complain	that
governmentality	scholars	collapse	historiography	into	abstract	programmes	(McKinlay	&	Pezet,	2010:	491),	the
tripartite	distinction	between	rationalities,	programmes,	and	technologies	should	be	seen	as	a	way	of	bringing
together	the	local	and	the	non-local,	the	macro	and	the	micro.	It	is	no	doubt	the	case	that	much	of	Foucault’s	later
writings	on	the	notion	of	governmentality	focus	on	the	more	abstract	and	macro	end	of	the	spectrum.	But,	as	has
been	pointed	out	more	recently,	a	concern	with	political	rationalities,	and	with	more	localized	political	programmes
such	as	the	‘Modernizing	Government’	initiative	in	the	UK,	can	fruitfully	be	linked	with	analysis	of	the	‘everyday
doings	of	practitioners’	(Kurunmäki	&	Miller,	2011).	This	is	not	a	matter,	however,	of	abandoning	the	analysis	of
political	rationalities	and	the	realm	of	the	programmatic.	Instead,	it	is	a	matter	of	seeking	to	trace	the	mediated	ways
in	which	larger	political	transformations	are	operationalized	and	instrumentalized	through	the	local	concerns	and
preoccupations	of	practitioners,	the	assembling	and	linking	together	of	disparate	and	possibly	competing	sets	of
actors,	activities,	and	aspirations	(Kurunmäki	&	Miller,	2011:	222;	see	also	Mennicken,	2008).	A	central	tenet	of
much	of	Foucault’s	writings	is	to	attend	to	the	multiplicity	of	objects,	domains,	layers,	and	strata	(Gordon,	2001:
xx).	Foucault	spoke	of	‘causal	multiplication’	as	a	way	of	analysing	the	singularity	of	an	event,	a	way	of	attending
to	the	multiple	processes	which	constitute	it	(Foucault,	1991	[1981]:	76).	This	means	discovering	the	connections,
the	encounters,	the	blockages,	the	plays	of	force,	the	strategies,	and	so	on	that	allow	something	such	as
incarceration	to	become	a	central	component	of	the	penal	order.	And	this	causal	multiplication,	according	to
Foucault,	always	retains	at	least	a	grain	of	thought	(Foucault,	2001	[1981]:	456)	(see	also	Gordon,	2001;	Hacking,
1992).
The	Foucault	Effect	in	Organization	Studies
Much	of	the	preceding	is,	of	course,	now	widely	accepted	by	many	scholars	of	organizations.	Foucauldian
categories	and	concepts	have	become	a	central	part	of	the	toolbox	(p.	21)	 of	organization	studies,	particularly
among	European	scholars,	although	others	still	appear	to	be	more	intent	on	rehearsing	or	reinstating	the	very
categories	that	Foucault’s	work	has	helped	displace.	It	is	not	our	aim	here	to	trace	or	celebrate	the	gradual
dissemination	of	Foucault’s	writings,	and	the	writings	of	his	co-travellers,	within	organization	studies.	But	we	do
think	it	is	helpful	to	offer	some	highly	selective	remarks	on	some	of	the	key	themes	and	studies	that	together	add
up	to	what	we	term	here	the	Foucault	effect	in	organization	studies	(see	also	Clegg,	Courpasson,	&	Phillips,	2006:
chapter	8),	while	also	offering	some	cautionary	remarks.	For	an	effect	of	this	kind	is	a	curious	phenomenon	(Carter,
2008),	it	is	something	that	spreads	itself	over	a	surface,	and	that	has	an	immanent	cause	that	is	difficult	to	separate
from	its	effects	(Deleuze,	2001:	70). 	The	‘Foucault	effect’	in	organization	studies	is	the	making	visible	of	a
particular	way	of	doing	the	history	of	the	present,	of	analysing	the	various	ways	in	which	the	administering	or
governing	of	lives	in	a	wide	range	of	settings	has	been	made	thinkable	and	practicable.	The	‘Foucault	effect’	in
organization	studies,	as	we	show	below,	has	made	a	significant	contribution	to	the	establishment	of	a	post-Marxist
platform	for	‘the	renewal	of	the	powers	of	critique’	(Burchell,	Gordon,	&	Miller,	1991:	x)	in	the	study	of
organizations.	It	has	helped	to	deprive	organizational	practices	and	technologies	of	their	self-evidence,
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acknowledging	‘that	there	is	a	parcel	of	thought	in	even	the	crassest	and	most	obtuse	parts	of	social	reality’
(Burchell,	Gordon,	&	Miller,	1991:	x).
Despite	these	welcoming	effects,	and	the	more	general	transformation	of	organization	studies	that	it	has	both
facilitated	and	benefitted	from,	we	suggest	that	the	utilization	of	Foucault’s	work	in	organization	studies	has	been
somewhat	partial,	and	that	there	is	still	much	more	that	can	be	done	to	benefit	from	his	insights.	We	argue	that
there	has	been	an	overemphasis	on	the	notion	of	discipline,	which	for	some	has	conjured	up	a	dystopian	image	of
a	totally	disciplined	society	and	a	neglect	of	resistance	(see	e.g.	Thompson	&	Ackroyd,	1995),	as	well	as	a	neglect
of	the	ways	in	which	subjects	relate	to	and	‘manoeuvre’	around	discourse	(Newton,	1996:	139).	This,	together	with
a	reluctance	on	the	part	of	some	to	set	aside	the	comforting	categories	of	domination	and	emancipation	that
Foucault’s	work	did	so	much	to	transcend,	means	that	there	has	been	less	attention	to	detailed	empirical	analysis
of	practices	and	the	assemblages	in	which	they	operate,	together	with	an	overpreoccupation	with	theoretical
micro-differentiation. 	As	a	result,	we	know	rather	less	than	we	should	about	the	remarkable	transformations	that
have	taken	place	across	the	past	two	decades	and	more	in	administrative	apparatuses	and	the	administering	of
lives	in	the	West	and	the	Rest	(Hall,	1992),	many	of	which	have	taken	place	within	the	orbit	of	neo-liberalism	and
associated	endeavours	to	economize	the	entire	social	sphere	(Çalışkan	&	Callon,	2009,	2010;	Mennicken,	2008;
Mennicken	&	Miller,	2012;	Miller	&	Power,	2013).
As	Carter	et	al.	(2002)	have	pointed	out,	although	Foucault	has	become	‘an	icon	and	a	fashion’	in	organization
studies	(Clegg,	Courpasson,	&	Phillips,	2006:	229;	but	see	also	Carter,	2008),	this	has	only	been	the	case	relatively
recently.	Indeed,	it	was	only	in	the	late	1990s	that	Foucault’s	ideas	began	to	achieve	momentum	in	organizational
sociology.	One	of	the	first	articles	that	sought	to	examine	how	Foucault’s	writings	might	be	used	for	organizational
analysis	appeared	in	the	journal	Organization	Studies	in	1988	(Burrell,	(p.	22)	 1988).	In	his	article,	‘Modernism,
Post	Modernism	and	Organizational	Analysis	2:	The	Contribution	of	Michel	Foucault’,	Gibson	Burrell	discussed	and
compared	the	notions	of	archaeology	and	genealogy,	and	sought	to	explicate	the	possible	implications	of
Foucault’s	notion	of	disciplinary	power	for	scholars	of	organizations.	He	pointed	in	particular	to	what	other
literatures	have	called	isomorphism,	although	in	this	instance	it	was	a	matter	of	asking,	following	Foucault,	how	it	is
that	prisons,	factories,	and	hospitals	come	to	‘resemble’	each	other.	He	also	considered	how	organization	scholars
might	extend	Foucault’s	insights	concerning	disciplinary	power	to	such	topics	as	information	technology,	spatial
design,	and	other	forms	of	surveillance.
One	year	earlier,	organization	theorist	Stewart	Clegg	wrote	a	discussion	note	in	which	he	reflected	on	the
adequacy	of	approaches	to	the	study	of	language	and	power	in	organization	analysis	(Clegg,	1987).	In	that	piece,
Clegg	suggested	developing	Foucault’s	(1977)	concerns	with	power	and	discourse	analysis	(see	also	Clegg	&
Hardy,	1996;	Hardy,	1996;	Phillips,	Lawrence,	&	Hardy,	2004).	A	couple	of	years	later,	in	1989,	Clegg	published	his
highly	influential	book	Frameworks	of	Power	(1989),	in	which	he	utilized	Foucault’s	work	on	power	in	his
conceptualization	of	‘circuits	of	power’	which	seeks	to	represent	the	ways	in	which	power	may	flow	through
different	modalities	(distinguishing	between	episodic,	dispositional,	and	facilitative	power)	(see	also	Clegg,
Courpasson,	&	Phillips,	2006:	240–7).	By	1994,	Clegg	was	writing	about	the	links	between	Foucault	and	Weber,
describing	Foucault	as	‘the	contemporary	theorist	who	has	come	nearest	to	carrying	out	a	Weberian	project	with
respect	to	the	analysis	of	organizations’	(Clegg,	1994:	149).	In	2006,	Clegg	reformulated	some	of	these	ideas	in
Power	and	Organizations,	co-authored	with	Courpasson	and	Phillips	(Clegg,	Courpasson,	&	Phillips,	2006:	chapter
8).	Drawing	on	Foucault,	Clegg	et	al.	highlighted	the	importance	of	looking	at	small	questions:	‘It	is	in	the	little	things
of	socially	constructed	normalcy	that	we	see	power	in	organizations	being	slowly	constructed’	(Clegg,
Courpasson,	&	Phillips,	2006:	228).	Taking	up	Foucault’s	conception	of	power,	together	with	later	work	on
governmentality	(Foucault,	1991	[1979],	2007;	Gordon,	1980b;	Miller	&	Rose,	1990;	Rose	&	Miller,	1992),	they
emphasized	the	‘play	of	techniques,	the	mundane	practices	that	shape	everyday	life’,	and	how	these	shape	and
structure	forms	of	conduct	and	selfhood	(Clegg,	Courpasson,	&	Phillips,	2006:	230).
In	the	early	years	of	the	reception	of	Foucault	in	organization	studies,	much	emphasis	was	placed	on	Foucault’s
relevance	for	the	study	of	mechanisms	of	surveillance	and	discipline	in	the	post-Fordist	organization:	the	rise	of
computer-based	monitoring,	the	use	of	closed-circuit	television	cameras,	and	the	just-in-time	labour	process	(see
in	particular	Sewell	&	Wilkinson,	1992;	but	see	also	Burrell,	1988;	and	Townley	1993,	1994),	as	well	as	the	effects
of	management	knowledge	on	the	constitution	of	the	employee	(Jacques,	1996).	Barbara	Townley,	a	colleague	of
Gibson	Burrell	at	Warwick,	before	moving	to	the	University	of	Alberta	in	the	early	1990s	(see	Carter,	2008:	19),
applied	Foucault’s	work	very	fruitfully	to	the	study	of	human	resource	management	(HRM)	(Townley,	1993,	1994).
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Townley	argued	that	HRM	should	be	understood	as	a	discourse	and	set	of	practices	that	attempt	to	reduce	the
indeterminacy	involved	in	the	employment	contract	(p.	23)	 (Townley,	1993).	Rereading	HRM	practices	from	a
Foucauldian	power-knowledge	perspective,	she	argued	that	power	in	organizations	is	employed	‘at	all	levels,	and
through	many	dimensions’	(Townley,	1993:	520;	but	see	also	Townley,	1994).	Following	Foucault,	she	highlighted
the	relational	aspect	of	power,	and	focused	on	the	‘how’	of	power	in	organizations:	the	practices,	techniques,	and
procedures	that	give	it	effect.	Studying	the	HRM	instruments	of	management	by	objectives	(MBO)	and	selection
testing,	and	echoing	Foucauldian	ideas	of	governmentality,	she	argued	that	‘HRM	serves	to	render	organizations
and	their	participants	calculable	arenas,	offering,	through	a	variety	of	technologies,	the	means	by	which	activities
and	individuals	become	knowable	and	governable’	(Townley,	1993:	526).
Parallel	to	Townley,	Grey	conducted	an	ethnographic	study	of	one	of	the	big	international	public	accounting	firms,
examining	the	disciplinary	and	socialization	techniques	applied	to	lower-level	entrants	which,	he	argued,	helped	to
constitute	‘the	career	as	a	project	of	the	self’	and	‘labour	process	discipline’	(Grey,	1994;	see	also	Grey,	1998).
Four	years	later,	in	1998,	Covaleski	et	al.	published	the	results	from	a	field	study	of	the	(then)	‘big	six’	public
accounting	firms,	in	which	they	examined	the	use	of	MBO	and	mentoring	in	administering	the	lives	of	accounting
professionals	(Covaleski	et	al.,	1998).	Utilizing	Foucault,	and	following	Grey	(1994)	and	Townley	(1993,	1994),	they
sought	to	describe	how	‘power	seeps	into	the	very	grain	of	individuals,	reaches	right	into	their	bodies,	permeates
their	gestures,	their	posture,	what	they	say,	how	they	learn	to	live	and	work	with	other	people’	(Foucault,	1977,
cited	in	Covaleski	et	al.	1998:	294).
These	and	other	Foucault-oriented	organization	studies	of	disciplinary	power,	mechanisms	of	surveillance,	and
technologies	of	the	self	(see	e.g.	the	edited	volume	by	McKinlay	&	Starkey,	1998),	made	an	important	contribution
to	understanding	‘power	and	subjectivity	at	work’	(Knights	&	Willmott,	1989).	David	Knights	and	Hugh	Willmott,	for
example,	drew	upon	the	work	of	Foucault	‘to	suggest	a	more	adequate	appreciation	of	processes	of	subjugation	in
which	subjectivity	is	fetishised	in	identity’	(Knights	&	Willmott,	1989:	535),	highlighting	the	connectedness	of	power
and	subjectivity	(see	also	Knights	&	McCabe,	1998;	McKinlay	&	Starkey,	1998).	Following	Foucault,	they	rejected
polarizations	of	subject	and	object,	and	drew	out	the	significance	of	the	‘production	of	subjects’	for	the
reproduction	of	the	capital–labour	relation	(Knights	&	Willmott,	1989:	543).	In	so	doing,	Knights	and	Willmott	sought
to	shift	attention	away	from	structuralist	and	Marxist	debates	in	organizational	sociology	(see	also	Clegg,	1989).	In
a	similar	move,	Sewell	and	Wilkinson	used	Foucault	to	show	that	just-in-time	and	total	quality	control	(TQM)	regimes
both	create	and	demand	systems	of	surveillance	to	instil	discipline	(Sewell	&	Wilkinson,	1992:	271;	see	also	the
works	by	Knights	&	McCabe	on	TQM,	e.g.	Knights	&	McCabe,	1998).
In	the	late	1980s,	and	throughout	the	1990s,	Foucault-oriented	scholarship	in	organization	studies	drew	mainly	on
Discipline	and	Punish,	with	its	emphasis	on	mechanisms	of	surveillance	as	a	modality	of	power/knowledge.	In
recent	years	the	emphasis	has	shifted,	and	increasing	attention	has	been	paid	to	Foucault’s	History	of	Sexuality
(McKinlay,	2006;	Starkey	&	Hatchuel,	2002;	Townley,	2002),	the	management,	conduct,	and	care	of	the	self
(McKinlay,	2002;	Pezet,	2007),	ethics	(Ibarra-Colado	et	al.	2006;	(p.	24)	 Parker,	1998;	Wray-Bliss,	2002),
Foucault’s	work	on	biopolitics	and	governmentality	(Munro,	2012),	the	diverse	arts	of	government,	resistance,	and
freedom	(see	e.g.	Barratt,	2008;	Caldwell,	2007;	Fleming	&	Spicer,	2003;	Jones	&	Spicer,	2005;	but	see	also	Rose,
1999),	as	well	as	Foucault’s	compatibility	with	critical	realism	(Al-Moudi,	2007).	Calls	have	also	been	made	to	make
more	use	in	organizational	sociology	of	Foucault’s	work	on	parrhesia	(Foucault,	2001),	the	enactment	of
provocative	dialogue,	to	counteract	the	often	meretricious	allegations	of	the	apolitical	nature	of	Foucauldian
scholarship	(see	in	particular	Barratt,	2008;	but	see	also	Skinner,	2011).	Referring	in	particular	to	Foucault’s	later
works,	Barratt	usefully	highlights	the	disruptive	potential	of	a	historical	sensibility,	and	suggests	reasserting	the
ethical	objectives	of	genealogy	as	a	way	of	disrupting	organizational	common	sense	(Barratt,	2008).	Barratt	also
argues	that	the	study	of	programmatic	statements	of	authorities	ought	to	be	complemented	with	studies	of	the
messy	and	compromised	ways	in	which	forms	of	(managerial)	knowledge	are	enacted	(see	also	O’Malley,	1996;
O’Malley,	Weir,	&	Shearing,	1997).	Ethnographic	research,	he	rightly	suggests,	has	a	role	to	play	here,	in
documenting	the	practical	dynamics	of	power	and	resistance,	and	allowing	for	the	possibility	that	the	voices	of	a
more	heterogeneous	range	of	organizational	actors	are	heard.	Barratt’s	article	is	valuable	in	drawing	attention	to
the	later	work	of	Foucault,	and	for	highlighting	its	ethico-political	dimensions.	Indeed,	much	of	what	he	says	is
consistent	with	the	arguments	in	the	preceding	section	of	this	chapter.	That	said,	insofar	as	it	does	not	provide
detailed	empirical	or	historical	engagement	with	specific	events	or	issues,	his	paper	runs	the	risk	of	reinforcing	the
somewhat	inward-looking	nature	of	many	debates	within	organizational	analysis,	where	micro-differentiations	in
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theoretical	credentials	appear	to	count	more	than	analysis	of	things	that	have	happened	or	are	happening	today.
Newton	(1998)	addresses	the	issue	of	subjectivity	in	the	writings	of	Foucault	and	organizational	Foucauldians,	and
rightly	notes	that	the	latter	often	end	up	invoking	notions	of	subjectivity	and	selfhood	that	are	at	odds	with
Foucault’s	discarding	of	the	ethical	polarization	of	subject	and	object.	Yet,	while	noting	Foucault’s	contribution	to	a
decentring	and	historicizing	of	the	notion	of	the	subject,	he	still	seems	to	yearn	for	an	ethics	of	the	‘real’	self,	one
that	would	tell	us	how	to	change	our	selves	and	the	world	we	inhabit,	something	that	Foucault	repeatedly
disavowed.
Organization	studies	has	benefitted	considerably	from	an	engagement	with	the	writings	of	Foucault	and	his	co-
workers.	But	we	suggest	that	this	engagement	has	been	somewhat	partial,	and	that	it	could	have	benefitted	more.
This	is	due	in	part,	we	suggest,	to	an	overpreoccupation	with	the	notion	of	discipline	and	the	image	of	a	totally
disciplined	society	or	organization.	But	it	is	also	due	to	repeated	and	often	meretricious	appeals	to	notions	of
resistance	and	the	importance	of	being	‘critical’	(see	e.g.	Thompson	&	Ackroyd,	1995),	as	if	critique	was	some	sort
of	historically	invariant	a	priori.	This	is	at	times	coupled	with	misguided	attempts	to	reframe	Foucault’s	categories
into	the	very	ones	that	his	work	has	sought	to	transcend.	The	notion	of	subjectivity	is	a	case	in	point	here,	and	in
the	preceding	section	we	have	sought	to	explain	how	we	understand	Foucault’s	notions	of	subjectivity	and
subjectivation,	which	takes	us	beyond	repeated	and	largely	empty	appeals	to	notions	of	agency.	In	place	of	such
internecine	squabbles	(p.	25)	 over	concepts	that	have	no	part	in	a	Foucauldian	analysis	of	the	stuff	of
organizational	life,	we	have	suggested	an	agenda	that	focuses	not	on	organizations,	not	on	discipline,	and	not	on
subjectivity,	as	if	these	were	foundational	categories	that	should	tell	us	how	and	what	to	analyse.	We	have
suggested	that	the	analysis	of	practices	should	be	primary,	together	with	analysis	of	the	assemblages	of	ideas	and
instruments,	actors,	and	aspirations	that	form	among	these	multiple	and	ontologically	distinct	components.	Just	as
ideas	do	not	work	by	themselves,	so	too	with	practices,	which	only	exist	within	historically	specific	rationalities	and
assemblages.	To	understand	such	assemblages	means	analysing	the	local	and	the	non-local,	the	macro	and	the
micro,	and	how	they	come	to	be	connected	(see	e.g.	Kurunmäki	&	Miller,	2011;	Mennicken,	2008;	Samiolo,	2012).
It	means	paying	attention	to	the	emergence	and	stabilization	of	novel	assemblages,	such	as	the	recent	and	still
ongoing	attempts	to	economize	the	entire	social	sphere	(see	also	Çalışkan	&	Callon,	2009,	2010).	And	it	means
acknowledging	the	importance	of	causal	multiplication,	rather	than	thinking	we	might	find	the	locus	of	change	in
one	place.	It	is,	we	suggest,	attempting	such	empirical	studies	that	will	allow	organization	scholars	to	benefit	further
from	a	critical	engagement	with	the	writings	of	Foucault,	and	in	turn	a	critical	engagement	with	the	phenomena	they
study.
Governing	and	Calculating
Foucault’s	analyses	of	power,	of	disciplinary	mechanisms,	and	of	governmental	rationalities	encourage	us	to	draw
out	the	inherently	political	character	of	technologies	of	organizing,	administering,	and	calculating	(Foucault,	1981
[1976]:	138). 	Such	Foucauldian	themes	featured	as	early	as	the	late	1980s	in	one	of	organization	studies’	most
proximate	neighbouring	disciplines,	the	field	of	accounting	studies	(see	also	Carter,	2008:	16;	Power,	2011).	With
Foucault,	such	studies	helped	us	to	see	the	conjoint	disciplining	effects	of	accounting	numbers,	their	involvement
in	the	production	of	neo-liberal	subjectivities,	and	their	contribution	in	a	particularly	personal	way	to	the
economizing	of	the	entire	social	field.	A	focus	on	the	technologies	of	accounting,	we	argue,	helped	us	get	to	grips
with	what	we	might	call	the	inner	workings	of	governmentality	(Burchell,	Gordon,	&	Miller,	1991;	Foucault,	2007,
2008),	in	particular	neo-liberal	modalities	of	governing	and	how	these	operate	within	and	through	organizations.
For	accounting	technologies	are	key	organizational	practices	that	have	helped	bring	about	a	significant	shift	in
how	power	is	exerted	in	advanced	industrial	societies.	Accounting	numbers,	such	as	those	produced	through
standard	costing	and	budgeting,	have	a	distinctive	capacity	for	acting	on	the	actions	of	others,	one	that	goes	far
beyond	the	abstract	injunctions	of	economic	theory.	Through	their	ability	to	produce	certain	forms	of	visibility	and
transparency,	accounting	numbers	both	create	and	constrain	subjectivity.	By	linking	decisions	to	the	supposedly
impersonal	logic	of	quantification	rather	than	to	subjective	judgement,	accounting	numbers	configure	persons,
domains,	and	actions	as	objective	and	comparable.	This,	in	turn,	renders	them	governable.	For	the	objects	and	(p.
26)	 subjects	of	economic	calculation,	once	standardized	through	accounting,	are	accorded	a	very	particular	form
of	visibility.	This	creates	distinctive	possibilities	for	intervention	while	potentially	displacing	others.
Accounting	technologies	make	it	possible	to	articulate	and	operationalize	abstract	neo-liberal	concepts,	such	as
notions	of	competitiveness,	markets,	efficiency,	and	entrepreneurship.	Accounting	numbers	constitute	firms,
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organizations,	and	sub-units	as	competing,	market-oriented	entities,	which	can	be	analysed,	compared,	and	acted
upon.	Accounting	makes	the	incomparable	comparable,	by	distilling	substantively	different	kinds	or	classes	of
things	into	a	single	financial	figure	(the	return	on	investment	of	a	division,	the	net	present	value	of	an	investment
opportunity,	the	financial	ratios	of	a	company)	(Miller,	1992,	2010).	Accounting	figures	can	also	turn	qualities	(e.g.
the	quality	of	health	care	or	the	decency	of	imprisonment)	into	quantities,	through	devices	such	as	patient
satisfaction	questionnaires,	rankings	(of	schools,	universities,	care	homes,	prisons,	and	so	on),	balanced	score-
cards,	and	much	else	besides.	These,	in	turn,	can	then	be	subjected	to	a	variety	of	further	calculations	and
comparisons	through	audits	and	other	forms	of	more	or	less	public	assessment	(Espeland	&	Sauder,	2007;
Kurunmäki	&	Miller,	2006;	Mennicken,	2010,	2013;	Power,	1997;	Samiolo,	2012).
This	way	of	understanding	and	analysing	the	roles	of	accounting	and	its	imbrication	in	a	more	general	economizing
of	the	entire	social	field	is	relatively	recent	(see	also	Miller	&	Power,	2013).	From	the	1950s	to	the	1970s,	the	social
scientific	understanding	of	calculative	technologies	in	organizations	remained	dominated	by	behavioural	studies	of
budgeting	and	management	control	systems	(see	e.g.	Argyris,	1954).	In	the	1980s	this	changed.	Inspired	to	a
significant	extent	by	Foucault’s	writings	(see	also	Power,	2011:	43–4),	Anthony	Hopwood,	who	in	1976	had
founded	the	now	internationally	reputed	journal	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society,	outlined	a	research
programme	that	placed	the	study	of	the	wider	social	and	political	aspects	of	accounting	practices	at	its	heart.	In
1985,	Hopwood	and	his	co-authors	outlined	‘a	three	branched	genealogy’	of	the	specific	social	space	within	which
ideas	and	techniques	of	value	added	accounting	appeared	and	developed	(Burchell,	Clubb,	&	Hopwood,	1985).
Drawing	on	Foucault’s	early	writings	(in	particular	Discipline	and	Punish),	and	at	a	time	when	others	were	starting
to	speak	in	terms	of	different	types	of	complexes	or	assemblages	(Donzelot,	1980;	Rose,	1985),	Hopwood	et	al.
described	this	social	space	as	an	‘accounting	constellation’,	‘a	particular	field	of	relations	which	existed	between
certain	institutions,	economic	and	administrative	processes,	bodies	of	knowledge,	systems	of	norms	and
measurement,	and	classification	techniques’	(Burchell,	Clubb,	&	Hopwood,	1985:	400).	In	1987,	Hopwood
developed	his	neo-Foucauldian	approach	to	the	study	of	accounting	further,	by	explicitly	utilizing	Foucault’s	notion
of	archaeology	(Hopwood,	1987).	In	the	same	year,	this	time	building	on	Foucault’s	histories	of	medicine,
psychiatry,	and	the	prison,	together	with	his	analyses	of	disciplinary	power,	Miller	and	O’Leary	examined	the
involvement	of	accounting	in	constructing	the	‘governable	person’	(Miller	&	O’Leary,	1987).	In	a	similar	vein,	in
their	study	of	‘The	Genesis	of	Accountability’	Hoskin	and	Macve	traced	how	the	US	Military	Academy	at	West	(p.
27)	 Point	contributed	to	the	production	of	a	meticulous	‘grammatocentric’	and	‘panoptic’	system	for	human
accountability	giving	rise	to	US	managerialism	in	the	nineteenth	century	(Hoskin	&	Macve,	1988).
Around	the	same	time,	Miller	and	Rose	set	out	some	of	the	contours	of	what	they	described	as	the	study	of	modes
of	governing	economic	life	(Miller	&	Rose,	1990,	2008),	while	the	study	of	governmentality	more	generally	began	to
flourish	through	a	number	of	forums,	including	the	loosely	formed	History	of	the	Present	group.	With	these
developments,	accounting,	and	instruments	of	performance	management	more	broadly,	began	to	be	analysed	in
the	context	of	organizations	as	a	technology	for	the	‘conduct	of	conducts’	(see	also	du	Gay,	1996a).	Power,	for
example,	investigated	the	audit	explosion	in	the	1980s	in	the	UK,	and	argued	that	the	rise	and	expansion	of
auditing	from	the	corporate	sector	to	the	public	sector	was	inextricably	linked	to	‘a	commitment	to	push	control
further	into	organizational	structures,	inscribing	it	within	systems	which	can	then	be	audited’	(Power,	1997:	42).
Drawing	on	Power’s	highly	influential	analysis	of	the	audit	society,	Radcliffe	examined	how	a	reconfiguration	of
political	rationalities	in	terms	of	performance-oriented	‘management’	stimulated	the	development	of	efficiency
auditing	in	the	local	government	of	Alberta	(Radcliffe,	1998).
The	authors	cited	above	have	drawn	explicitly	on	Foucault’s	writings,	particularly	his	remarks	on	governmentality.
They	have	also	drawn	on	concepts	borrowed	from	elsewhere,	including	social	studies	of	science,	the	philosophy
of	science,	actor-network	theory,	and	new	institutionalism,	to	name	just	the	most	obvious.	They	always	studied
‘events’,	characterized	by	their	singularity	and	a	principle	of	‘causal	multiplication’,	as	Foucault	put	it	when	arguing
for	the	importance	of	‘lightening	the	weight	of	causality’	(Foucault,	1991	[1981]:	76–7).	The	above	studies	have
used	Foucault’s	writings	to	generate	a	heuristic	for	empirically	rich	and	historically	sensitive	descriptions	of	the
multifaceted	roles	that	organization	and	calculation	play	in	the	governing	of	economic	and	social	life.	As	Miller	and
Rose	(2008:	5)	have	put	it,	more	important	than	a	quest	to	faithfully	replicate	a	particular	concept	or	method	is
something	rather	more	elusive,	a	mode	of	analysis,	an	ethos	of	investigation	that	was	opened	up	by	Foucault’s
writings.	That,	we	suggest,	is	the	distinctive	contribution	of	the	encounter	between	scholars	of	accounting	and	the
Foucauldian	concern	with	analysing	the	diverse	modalities	through	which	the	administering	of	lives	is	achieved.
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Conclusions
The	writings	of	Michel	Foucault	have	been	an	inspiration	to	many	who	have	sought	to	understand	and	analyse	the
ways	in	which	our	lives	are	administered	and	organized.	They	have	also	perplexed	or	irritated	others,	who	have
seen	them	as	arcane	or	anaesthetizing	(Foucault,	1991	[1981]:	82–6;	but	see	also	Curtis,	1995;	Froud	et	al.,	1998;
(p.	28)	 McKinlay	&	Pezet,	2010).	In	this	chapter,	we	have	attempted	to	distil	what	many	have	seen	of	value	in
Foucault’s	writings,	while	seeking	also	to	dispel	some	of	the	misconceptions	surrounding	his	work,	which	may	have
put	off	those	who	would	otherwise	have	found	it	to	be	of	value.	We	identified	four	themes	that	have	animated
Foucault’s	writings	across	three	decades	or	so.	First,	we	have	emphasized	his	preference	for	‘how’	type	questions
rather	than	‘why’	type	questions.	Second,	we	have	highlighted	his	concern	with	subjectivity	or	personhood,	which
entailed	setting	aside	the	ethical	polarization	of	subject	and	object,	in	favour	of	an	analysis	of	the	historically
varying	ways	in	which	the	capacities	and	attributes	of	subjects	are	constituted.	Third,	we	have	drawn	attention	to
Foucault’s	preference	for	studying	practices—practices	of	organizing,	governing,	and	calculating—rather	than
organizations,	and	for	examining	such	practices	in	terms	of	the	affiliations	that	emerge	among	practices,	so	as	to
form	assemblages	of	interdependent	practices.	Fourth,	we	have	remarked	on	Foucault’s	insistence	that	practices
do	not	exist	outside	a	particular	regime	of	rationality,	but	that	such	regimes	of	rationality	need	to	be	analysed	in	the
multiple	and	diverse	fields	in	which	they	are	formulated,	rather	than	in	terms	of	a	singular	process	of	rationalization.
We	have	emphasized	that	these	four	themes	are	not	meant	to	be	exhaustive,	and	that	other	ways	of	delineating
the	multiple	strands	of	Foucault’s	writings	are	of	course	possible.	We	suggest,	however,	that	these	four	themes
have	animated	his	writings	across	the	large	part	of	his	oeuvre,	and	that	they	form	a	more	or	less	coherent	and
complementary	set	of	concerns	that	are	relevant	to	scholars	of	organizations.	A	word	of	caution	is	in	order	here.
We	have	emphasized	the	elements	of	continuity	in	Foucault’s	concerns,	rather	than	seeking	to	periodize	or
partition.	This	of	course	is	not	to	suggest	that	there	are	no	shifts	of	emphasis	in	Foucault’s	writings,	whether	subtle
or	at	times	significant,	nor	that	he	has	not	reframed	the	objects	of	his	concern,	and	more	than	once.	And	it
certainly	does	not	mean	that	there	has	been	a	continuity	of	empirical	objects.	Far	from	it,	indeed	one	of	the
remarkable	achievements	of	Foucault’s	writings	has	been	their	ability	to	cover	such	a	broad	range	of	phenomena,
including	madness,	the	body,	sexuality,	punishment,	and	selfhood	more	generally.	Such	objects	of	concern	may
appear,	to	those	unfamiliar	with	Foucault’s	writings,	to	be	distant	from	the	study	of	organizations.	But	we	hope	to
have	shown,	in	our	schematic	coverage	of	Foucault’s	writings,	in	our	discussion	of	the	‘Foucault	effect	in
organization	studies’,	and	in	our	brief	discussion	of	Foucault-inspired	studies	in	accounting,	how	the	themes	that
have	featured	in	such	studies	have	implications	for	scholars	of	organizations.
In	view	of	some	of	the	misunderstandings	that	Foucault’s	writings	have	at	times	evoked,	it	may	be	worth	noting
some	caveats.	For	instance,	a	concern	with	‘how’	type	questions	does	not	mean	neglecting	analysis	of	the
conditions	which	have	made	possible	certain	changes,	whether	within	relatively	localized	settings	in	firms	or	other
organizations	(such	as	the	layout	of	a	factory	floor),	or	larger-scale	social	transformations	(such	as	the	ways	in
which	public	services	are	organized	and	delivered),	or	more	generally	the	ways	in	which	work	and	the
administering	of	the	workplace	is	enacted	and	valorized	at	the	societal	level	(du	Gay,	1996b;	Kurunmäki	&	Miller,
2011;	Mennicken,	2013;	(p.	29)	 Miller	&	O’Leary,	1993,	1994a;	Miller	&	Rose,	1995b).	We	have	pointed	in	this
chapter	to	the	notion	of	‘surfaces	of	emergence’	that	Foucault	coined	as	early	as	1972,	as	well	as	to	his	appeal
nearly	a	decade	later	to	‘causal	multiplication’	and	‘lightening	the	weight	of	causality’.	In	differing	ways,	such
concepts	point	towards	a	gentler	form	of	causality	than	some	continue	to	quest	for.	But	they	certainly	do	not
suggest	the	abnegation	of	a	concern	to	analyse	the	conditions	that	have	made	possible	the	emergence	of
phenomena	that	are	new,	and	that	deserve	our	attention.
Similarly,	a	concern	with	the	ways	in	which	the	capacities	and	attributes	of	subjects	are	historically	formed,
whether	in	the	workplace,	the	home,	the	school,	or	wherever,	does	not	mean	that	the	making	up	of	persons	is	an
epistemological	blank	cheque.	The	formation	of	modern	notions	of	actorhood	has	been	a	lengthy	and	complex
process,	and	it	is	still	ongoing	(Hacking,	2002;	Meyer	&	Jepperson,	2000;	Rose,	1989).	To	borrow	the	delightfully
prosaic	terminology	of	Ian	Hacking,	‘ideas’	and	‘things’	play	important	roles	here	(Hacking,	1992).	Relatedly,	and	to
invoke	Foucauldian	terminology,	to	analyse	the	interdependence	between	what	is	said	and	what	is	done,	between
rationalities,	programmes,	and	technologies,	suggests	a	nuanced	notion	of	practices	which	requires	us	to	be
attentive	to	the	grain	of	thought	that	is	present	in	even	the	most	mundane	parts	of	social	reality	(Burchell,	Gordon,
&	Miller,	1991:	x).	Practices	can	assume	a	variety	of	forms,	and	the	study	of	their	interrelations	leads	us	from	highly
localized	or	‘micro’	settings	to	much	larger	or	‘macro’	issues,	and	back	again.
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Our	discussion	of	the	‘Foucault	effect’	in	the	domain	of	organization	studies	has	embraced	those	writings	that	have
explicitly	sought	to	utilize	and	extend	Foucault’s	concerns.	But	we	do	not	view	such	an	‘effect’	as	limited	to	those
that	explicitly	affiliate	themselves	with	or	cite	Foucault.	It	is	a	much	broader	phenomenon,	and	goes	significantly
beyond	so-called	governmentality	studies.	The	Foucault	effect	in	organization	studies	is	as	much	to	do	with	the
writings	of	Ian	Hacking,	Anthony	Hopwood,	Ted	Porter,	John	Meyer	and	his	colleagues,	and	Michael	Power,	as	well
as	those	who	have	studied	processes	of	standardization	more	generally	(Brunsson	&	Jacobsson,	2000;	Higgins	&
Larner,	2010).	The	intellectual	partitioning	that	suffuses	the	social	and	political	sciences,	in	an	era	when
interdisciplinary	work	is	trumpeted	ever	louder,	is	as	much	a	potential	impediment	to	organization	scholars	as	it	is
to	other	areas	of	enquiry.	One	small	hope	that	we	have	in	writing	this	chapter	is	that	it	may	help	attenuate	such
partitioning.
Finally,	some	brief	words	of	a	prospective	rather	than	retrospective	nature	may	be	appropriate	in	conclusion.	It
would	be	fair	to	say	that	Foucault’s	own	writings	have	typically	addressed	large-scale	transformations	that	have
taken	place	over	several	decades,	and	in	some	cases	over	much	longer	timeframes.	Organization	scholars	are
often	interested,	at	least	in	part,	in	more	localized	changes,	within	and	between	organizations,	whether	conducted
ethnographically	or	otherwise.	We	have	argued	here	that	there	is	much	of	value	in	the	writings	of	Foucault	for	such
studies,	and	indeed	there	are	already	examples	of	such	studies.	But	much	more	can	no	doubt	be	done	in	this
respect,	if	the	principle	of	multiplication—of	levels,	domains,	and	practices—is	respected,	and	also	if	the	links
between	such	different	levels,	domains,	and	practices	is	fully	explored	so	as	to	analyse	the	assemblages	that	form.
It	is	not	easy	to	study	the	conjoint	emergence	of	(p.	30)	 practices	and	their	associated	rationales	in	both	local
and	non-local	settings,	but	our	understanding	of	the	administering	of	lives	within	and	beyond	organizations	will	be
advanced	to	the	extent	that	we	attempt	such	studies.	Much	can	also	be	gained	if	we	attend	more	explicitly	to	the
roles	played	by	what	have	been	called	‘mediating	instruments’	or	‘mediating	models’	(Miller	&	O’Leary,	2007;
Morgan,	2012;	Morrison	&	Morgan,	1999;	Wise,	1988).	While	organization	scholars	have	paid	great	attention	to
inter-organizational	relations,	less	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	instruments	that	help	link	actors	and	aspirations,
the	devices	that	facilitate	the	transfer	of	information	across	domains	and	among	formally	separate	legal	entities.
Likewise,	we	suggest	that	scholars	of	organizations	could	pay	more	attention	to	the	multiple	forms	of	territorializing
(Brown,	Lawrence,	&	Robinson,	2005;	Elden,	2007;	Mennicken	&	Miller,	2012;	Miller	&	Power,	2013).	As	Elden
(2007)	has	remarked,	territory	is	more	than	merely	land,	and	territorializing	is	not	confined	to	states	and	statehood.
For	Foucault,	what	occurred	was	not	a	substitution	of	a	‘territorial	state’	with	a	‘population	state’,	but,	as	he	put	it	in
the	course	summary	of	Security,	Territory,	Population,	‘a	shift	of	accent	and	the	appearance	of	new	objectives,
and	hence	of	new	problems	and	new	techniques’	(Foucault,	2007:	325).	Put	differently,	attending	to	processes	of
territorializing	is	a	matter	of	exploring	how	the	administering	of	lives,	the	governing	of	children,	of	souls,	of
households,	of	hospitals,	of	teachers,	of	managers,	of	social	workers,	of	retired	persons,	and	much	more	besides,
depends	on	a	series	of	micro-territorializations	(Mennicken	&	Miller,	2012).	Instruments	and	practices	of	organizing,
including	calculative	practices	and	the	abstract	ideas	that	animate	them,	play	a	vital	role	here.	Instruments	of
accountancy,	used	widely	in	and	on	organizations,	for	example,	presuppose	and	recursively	construct	the
calculable	spaces	that	actors	inhabit	within	organizations	and	society.	This	may	be	a	matter	of	delineating
particular	physical	spaces,	such	as	a	factory	floor	or	a	subarea	of	it,	an	office,	a	hospital	ward,	or	any	other
accounting	unit.	Or	it	may	be	a	matter	of	defining	a	more	abstractly	conceived	space,	such	as	a	department,	a
division,	a	particular	cost	centre,	and	a	group	of	users	or	customers	(Miller	&	Power,	2013:	559;	but	see	also	Miller,
1992;	Mennicken	&	Miller,	2012).
These	are	just	some	suggestions	for	how	Foucault’s	work	may	be	relevant	to	organizational	scholars	in	the	future.
There	remains	much	to	be	gained,	we	suggest,	from	a	critical	engagement	with	Foucault’s	writings	through	detailed
empirical	investigations	of	the	varied	laboratories	for	the	administering	of	lives,	particularly	if	such	investigations
respect	the	principles	of	multiplication	and	the	conjoint	emergence	of	practices	and	their	associated	rationales.	By
removing	the	restriction	of	analysing	only	organizations,	or	even	sets	or	networks	of	organizations,	a	substantial
new	empirical	domain	is	opened	up,	one	that	is	populated	by	assemblages	for	the	administering	of	lives	that	form	in
both	local	and	non-local	settings,	that	effect	multiple	forms	of	territorializing,	and	that	are	facilitated	in	large	part	by
a	plethora	of	mediating	instruments.	From	such	a	perspective,	the	stuff	of	organizational	life	is	much	more	varied
than	it	has	at	times	appeared,	and	we	can	study	it	as	it	is,	rather	than	trying	to	force	it	into	unnecessarily
constraining	categories.
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Notes:
(*)	We	would	like	to	acknowledge	the	comments	and	encouragement	provided	by	the	editors	of	this	volume	on
earlier	versions	of	this	chapter,	and	Paul	du	Gay	in	particular.	Also,	we	would	like	to	note	the	very	helpful
comments	and	reflections	provided	by	Chris	Carter,	especially	regarding	the	utilization	of	Foucault	by	organization
scholars.
(1)	.	There	are	of	course	exceptions,	and	without	invidiously	itemizing	them	we	examine	some	of	them	in	what
follows.
(2)	.	We	have	reflected	on	this	curious	non-encounter,	albeit	without	any	plausible	explanations.	It	is	particularly
puzzling,	given	the	significant	personal	and	institutional	connections	that	existed	at	various	points.
(3)	.	Over	his	relatively	short	lifespan,	Foucault	has	produced	numerous	works,	well	known	and	widely	cited
classics,	such	as	Discipline	and	Punish	(1977),	The	History	of	Sexuality	(1981	[1976]),	Madness	and	Civilization
(1967),	The	Order	of	Things	(1970/2002),	and	The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge	(1972),	but	also	less	widely	cited
books,	such	as	The	Birth	of	the	Clinic	(1973).	Further,	he	has	written	a	great	number	of	essays	(see	e.g.	Rabinow,
Michel Foucault and the Administering of Lives
Page 21 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: London School of Economics and Political Science; date: 09 April 2015
1984/1991).	He	has	given	a	range	of	short	interviews	(see	e.g.	Gordon,	1980b),	and	he	has	left	behind	a	vast
archive	of	lectures,	notes,	and	correspondences,	which	continue	to	keep	Foucault	scholars	busy.
(4)	.	Miller	and	O’Leary	(1994b),	for	example,	utilize	the	notion	of	assemblage	to	draw	attention	to	the	ensemble	of
actors,	instruments,	ideas	and	interventions,	and	the	multiplicity	of	locales,	within	which	the	factory	(in	this	case
Caterpillar)	was	problematized	and	proposals	for	redesigning	it	emerged	(492).
(5)	.	See	also	Burchell	et	al.	(1991).
(6)	.	There	are	of	course	important	exceptions,	and	we	address	some	of	those	below.	Anthony	Hopwood	(2009:
517),	in	a	discussion	of	critical	management	studies,	referred	to	the	preoccupation	with	theory	in	characteristically
pithy	language	as	‘endless	minor	theorizing’.
(7)	.	Again,	there	are	exceptions	to	this,	and	we	consider	some	of	them	below.
(8)	.	See	also	the	book	by	Burrell	(1997),	which	featured	Foucault	and	became	an	important	landmark	in
organization	theory.
(9)	.	This	section	has	been	adapted	from	Mennicken	and	Miller	(2012).
Andrea	Mennicken
Andrea	Mennicken	is	Associate	Professor	in	accounting	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	(LSE)	and
Deputy	Director	of	the	Centre	for	Analysis	of	Risk	and	Regulation	(LSE).	She	received	her	doctorate	from	LSE	in	2005	on	a	thesis
entitled	Moving	West:	The	Emergence,	Reform	and	Standardisation	of	Audit	Practices	in	Post-Soviet	Russia.	She	holds	a	Master
(LSE)	and	German	Diploma	Degree	(University	of	Bielefeld)	in	sociology.	Her	work	has	been	published	in	the	journals	Accounting,
Organizations	and	Society,	Financial	Accountability	and	Management,	Foucault	Studies,	and	different	edited	volumes.	She	has	co-
edited	(with	Hendrik	Vollmer)	Zahlenwerk:	Kalkulation,	Organisation	und	Gesellschaft	[Number	Work:	Calculation,	Organisation
and	Society]	(2007).	Her	research	interests	include	social	studies	of	valuation	and	accounting,	transnational	governance	regimes,
processes	of	economization	and	marketization,	standardization,	and	public	sector	reforms	with	a	special	focus	on	prisons.
Peter	Miller
Peter	Miller	is	Professor	of	Management	Accounting	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	and	an	Associate	of
the	Centre	for	Analysis	of	Risk	and	Regulation.	He	is	an	Editor	of	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society,	and	has	published	in	a
wide	range	of	accounting,	management,	and	sociology	journals,	including	The	Academy	of	Management	Annals,	Accounting,
Auditing	and	Accountability	Journal,	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society,	British	Journal	of	Sociology,	Economy	and	Society,
European	Accounting	Review,	Financial	Accountability	&	Management,	Journal	of	Cultural	Economy,	Foucault	Studies,
Management	Accounting	Research,	and	Social	Research.	He	was	an	editor	of	I&C	(previously	Ideology	&	Consciousness),	and	co-
editor	of	The	Foucault	Effect	(1991).	In	1987	he	published	Domination	and	Power,	and	in	1986	co-edited	(with	Nikolas	Rose)	The
Power	of	Psychiatry.	More	recently,	he	has	co-edited	(with	the	late	Anthony	Hopwood)	Accounting	as	Social	and	Institutional
Practice	(1994)	and	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Institutions	(2009).	In	2008	he	published	(jointly	with	Nikolas	Rose)	Governing
the	Present.
Access	is	brought	to	you	by 	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science
